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1. INTRODUCTION
 Food stores are filled to the brim with groceries, but most of us here 
are jobless and therefore have no money to consistently buy very basic 
foodstuffs, resulting in us having mostly one meal per day (Josphat 
Madyira, 2015).1
For two decades Zimbabwe has suffered a profound political, economic 
and social malaise. Although the country was a net exporter of food in 
the 1980s and early 1990s, after 2000 it became a net food importer and 
a major recipient of food aid.2 These years were also characterized by a 
negative GDP growth rate, rising unemployment, increasing poverty, 
hyperinflation, mass out-migration and recurrent national food short-
ages.3 Most households in the country struggled to meet their food needs. 
While both rural and urban households were subjected to this turbulent 
environment, the challenges for households in the city, particularly the 
poor, were acute given the massive job losses resulting from economic 
decline, increases in the cost of housing, water, electricity and transpor-
tation, and hyperinflation.4 The causes of the crisis have been widely 
debated but there is consensus that it reached its nadir in 2008.5 GDP 
had contracted by over 40% between 2000 and 2006; annual inflation 
increased from two-digit figures in 2000 to 231 million percent in July 
2008 and the country’s external debt ballooned to USD6 billion in 2008.6 
Life expectancy, which had peaked at 61 years in 1990, fell to around 36 
years in 2008. That year, political violence and the accumulation of failed 
economic policies contributed to a drop in food production and a halt to 
imports, which created a humanitarian emergency that affected millions 
of households in Zimbabwe. The country received USD490 million in 
humanitarian aid in 2008, while its foreign currency reserves stood at 
only USD6 million.
To understand the scope of the food security challenge that confronted 
households in Zimbabwe during the crisis, it is necessary to recall the 
broader economic and political context created by the country’s Eco-
nomic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP), the Fast Track Land 
Reform Programme (FTLRP) and Operation Murambatsvina (Restore 
Order). All of these politically-inspired developments played a role in 
undermining urban livelihoods and increasing household food insecuri-
ty.7 ESAP laid the foundation for the serious downward trajectory in the 
Zimbabwean economy in the late 1990s and 2000s.8 The programme was 
introduced in Zimbabwe in 1991 when the country’s post-independence 
economic growth was slowing, foreign investment was declining, and 
unemployment was increasing. ESAP was meant to revamp the economy, 
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encourage investment and reduce the country’s domestic and internation-
al debt through a three-pronged strategy of trade liberalization, domestic 
deregulation and investment promotion, and fiscal and monetary policies 
to curtail state expenditure. In practice, these austerity measures led to the 
closure of many factories, large-scale retrenchments, declining real wages, 
skyrocketing consumer prices, and a decline in the formal economy.9 
Another critical development with direct food security implications was 
the launch of the government’s land reform programme in 2000. The 
FTLRP aimed to expropriate the country’s white-owned farms and 
redistribute them to indigenous black farmers. By the end of 2002, only 
600 of 4,500 white farmers were still in the country.10 Although over 1.2 
million black farmers benefitted from the FTLRP, national agricultural 
production drastically declined as the new occupants lacked the finan-
cial resources, inputs, labour, equipment and expertise to produce on 
the same scale. As a result, the country quickly changed from being a 
net exporter to a net importer of food. Maize production deficits aver-
aged over 500,000 tonnes per annum after 2000. While production levels 
improved somewhat in the newly resettled areas after 2004, they did not 
offset the losses incurred by the termination of white commercial agricul-
ture. From its inception, the programme greatly increased food insecurity 
in the country. In urban areas, the impact was particularly negative as very 
little food filtered into towns and cities from the rural areas to feed those 
already reeling under the general macro-economic meltdown. 
In 2005, the government launched an assault on all forms of urban infor-
mality, including the informal food economy. Operation Murambats-
vina destroyed backyard houses, vending stalls, flea markets and informal 
businesses in many cities.11 Although the motives behind the campaign 
are disputed (with some seeing it as a politically-motivated attack on 
opposition strongholds in the urban areas), there is no denying that it 
caused massive disruption of livelihoods and destruction of urban hous-
ing. Many income-generating projects were destroyed and more than 
700,000 urbanites lost their homes, jobs and livelihoods. Operation Gari-
kayi, launched in the aftermath of Operation Murambatsvina to construct 
houses for some of the affected families, failed to mitigate the negative 
impacts as the government had neither the capacity nor the resources to 
ensure meaningful reparations. Operation Murambatsvina rearranged 
Zimbabwe’s urban landscape and worsened the plight of the urban poor, 
increasing their vulnerability to hunger and food insecurity. 
The impacts of these policies were exacerbated by serious economic 
mismanagement. As one commentator noted: “Ill-conceived macroeco-
nomic policies superimposed on counterproductive trade and industrial 
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policies joined with a crisis and the worst global recession since the 1930s 
to hurl Zimbabwe into the recessionary jaws of hyperinflation. The lack 
of sound economic policies and the failure to service past debt meant that 
access to foreign borrowing was lost.”12 By 2008, the food situation in 
Zimbabwe was dire. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
Crescent Societies estimated that about 5.1 million of the country’s 11.6 
people would have no access to food by the end of that year. The govern-
ment was constrained from importing food by inadequate funding and 
rampant inflation. From April to October 2008, both the government 
and humanitarian agencies managed to import a total of only 316,000 
metric tonnes of cereals, leaving the cereal harvest deficit for 2008/2009 at 
666,000 metric tonnes. Although the government indicated that it would 
import 600,000 tonnes of maize from South Africa, only 175,000 metric 
tonnes had been imported by the end of August 2008. 
For most of 2008, the market was characterized by constant staple food 
shortages. The formal food system virtually collapsed and most foodstuffs 
could only be accessed on the parallel market. The situation was particu-
larly grave in urban areas where households had to purchase most of their 
food. Further aggravating the economic crisis was political uncertainty 
resulting from the disputed 2008 election. Harmonized elections for 
municipal, parliamentary and presidential positions were held in March 
2008, but disputes surrounding the outcome of the presidential election, 
and the subsequent run-off poll that was boycotted by the opposition, 
created a volatile atmosphere in the country. 
The 2008 crisis coincided with the implementation of a baseline house-
hold food security survey by AFSUN in low-income areas of 11 Southern 
African cities including Harare. Among the 462 households surveyed in 
Harare, rates of formal unemployment and food poverty were extremely 
high. Almost all were food insecure (96%) and nearly three-quarters 
(72%) were severely food insecure.13 Dietary diversity was lower than in 
any other city in Southern Africa. Indeed, households in low-income 
urban areas in Harare were far worse off in terms of all the food insecurity 
and poverty indicators than households in the other 10 Southern African 
cities surveyed by AFSUN. 
After 2008, Zimbabwe’s political and economic situation stabilized 
somewhat. During the eight months following the election run-off, for 
example, the ruling party and the opposition negotiated the terms of a 
power-sharing agreement. The resulting Government of National Unity 
was inaugurated in February 2009 and was to last until 2013. The forma-
tion of this coalition government and the abandonment of the Zimba-
bwean dollar helped to stabilize the economy, arresting the precipitous 
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decline in GDP, bringing down inflation, introducing a multi-currency 
regime and improving the food supply.14 Between 2009 and 2011, Zim-
babwe’s GDP growth averaged 7.3%, making it one of the world’s fastest 
growing economies, albeit from a very low base. According to the World 
Bank, Zimbabwe experienced an economic rebound after 2009 “and 
with the support of record international price levels, exports of minerals 
- notably diamonds, platinum, gold, and other products - have injected 
new life into the economy.”15 Zimbabwean trade flows rebounded with 
exports rising at 39% per year. Imports also rose quickly, averaging 34% 
per year from 2009 to 2011, in response to domestic demand. However, 
mining accounted for a significant proportion of export growth, consti-
tuting 50% of total exports during the period 2010-2012,16 and the grow-
ing reliance of the economy on mineral exports, low investor confidence 
and limited foreign direct investment have all constrained job creation and 
wealth redistribution. 
As the economy stabilized, domestic food production increased and shops 
restocked with food imported primarily from South Africa. Given the 
straitened circumstances of most urban households in 2008, there were 
grounds for optimism that post-crisis economic recovery and political sta-
bility might exercise a positive impact on urban food security in the coun-
try. However, political tensions continue to reduce the state’s effectiveness 
in improving the everyday lives of most citizens, and particularly urban 
residents who wanted fundamental political reforms and grew increas-
ingly disillusioned with the coalition government.17 The 2013 election 
gave the ZANU-PF full control over government but subsequent policies 
have led to staple food supply problems, price increases, and vulnerability 
to changes in weather.18 At the same time, formal and informal sector 
retailers have proliferated in Zimbabwe’s cities and continue to re-shape 
urban food networks and consumption patterns.
The central question addressed in this report is whether food security in 
Zimbabwe’s urban centres has improved since the height of the crisis. In 
other words, are positive macro-economic trends translating into ground-
level improvements in incomes, poverty levels and food security? There 
is certainly an argument that little has changed for those at the bottom: 
problems of unemployment and low salaries have persisted. Most house-
holds face new challenges: the debt burden resulting from the unilateral 
conversion of household water, electricity and other municipal charges 
to the US dollar, high tariffs charged by local authorities, and the high 
costs of health and education services and transportation, which leave res-
idents with little money to purchase food.19 To try to answer this question, 
AFSUN conducted a follow-up household food security survey in Harare 
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in 2012. The areas of the city surveyed and the survey instrument used 
were the same as in 2008, allowing for direct longitudinal comparisons of 
continuity and change. This report is structured along the same lines as 
the 2008 survey report and makes direct comparisons between the find-
ings at these two points in time.
2. METHODOLOGY
The 2008 and 2012 surveys took place in the same three low-income 
neighbourhoods of Harare – Mabvuku, Tafara, and Dzivarasekwa. Mab-
vuku and Tafara are contiguous neighbourhoods established in the 1950s 
to accommodate black rural-to-urban migrant labourers on the eastern 
fringes of the city. Mabvuku and Tafara hosted many individuals and 
events associated with the anti-colonial movement in the twentieth cen-
tury, and today the neighbourhood continues to be a centre for political 
resistance and activism. Dzivarasekwa was established later but serves a 
similar purpose in housing low-income families in high-density settle-
ments. Within each of the selected neighbourhoods, participating house-
holds were randomly selected and household heads or their representa-
tives were identified within each of these households for interview. A total 
of 351 households (with 1,517 individuals) were interviewed in the three 
study areas in 2012, lower than the 462 interviewed in 2008 but sufficient 
to make meaningful comparisons (Table 1). Enumerators from the Uni-
versity of Zimbabwe collected data from the households using the stan-
dardized AFSUN questionnaire. The questionnaire gathered information 
about household demographic characteristics, poverty data, income and 
expenditure patterns, household food security, food consumption pat-
terns, and household coping mechanisms.
The mean household size in 2012 was 4.3, significantly lower than the 
mean of 5.6 in 2008 (Table 1). The largest household in 2008 had 16 
members while the largest household in 2012 had 13. The proportion 
of households with 1-5 members increased from 56% in 2008 to 77% 
in 2012. On the other hand, the proportion of larger households with 
6-10 members fell from 42% in 2008 to 22% in 2012. Extremely small 
households with one or two members were more prevalent in the 2012 
sample (19%) than in 2008 (5%). Although the reasons for this apparently 
dramatic reshaping of household demography are open to speculation, the 
data on household type provides a possible clue.
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FIGURE 1: Location of Study Areas in Harare
Source: Adapted from www.googlemaps.com
TABLE 1: Sample and Household Size
2008 2012
Total number of households sampled 462 351
Total sample population 2,572 1,517
Average household size 5.6 4.3
Median household size 5.0 4.0
Smallest household size 1 1
Largest household size 16 13
The AFSUN survey questionnaire categorized households into four 
types based on the gender and relationships of the members. Female-
centred households are headed by a woman without a partner and include 
any combination of immediate relatives (including her children, siblings, 
parents and grandparents). The proportion of female-centred households 
in the 2012 survey (24%) was almost the same as in 2008 (23%) (Table 
2). Male-centred households are headed by a man without a partner and 
include any combination of immediate relatives (including his children, 
siblings, parents and grandparents). The proportion of male-headed 
households in 2012 (9%) was also very similar to 2008 (8%) (Table 2). 
Nuclear households include a head and a spouse or partner, with or with-
out children, but without other relatives in the household. The propor-
tion of nuclear households in 2012 was 44%, a slight increase from 37% 
in the 2008 survey (Table 2). Finally, extended households have a head, a 
spouse or partner, immediate relatives and a combination of other mem-
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bers (relatives and non-relatives). The proportion of extended households 
decreased from 32% in 2008 to 22% in 2012 (Table 2). One reason for 
the decline in overall household size therefore appears to be a decline in 
the number of extended family units, suggesting that at the height of the 
crisis taking in impoverished or destitute relatives may have been a coping 
strategy.
TABLE 2: Household Types in Surveyed Population
2008 2012
No. % No. %
Female-centred 104 23 85 24
Male-centred 35 8 32 9
Nuclear 173 37 156 44
Extended 150 32 78 22
3. CHANGES IN EMPLOYMENT, 
 INCOME AND EXPENDITURE
A comparison of the 2008 and 2012 employment profile of household 
members suggests little change in the labour market prospects of poor 
urban households in Harare. Overall employment was only slightly differ-
ent in 2012 (59% employed) than it had been in 2008 (58% employed). 
Unemployment figures were also very similar (at 42% in 2008 and 40% 
in 2012). However, within each sub-category there were clear shifts. First, 
among the employed there was a move away from full-time towards part-
time employment. The proportion of all working-age adults employed 
full-time fell from 43% to 35% between 2008 and 2012 and the propor-
tion employed part-time increased from 15% to 24%. Second, among 
the unemployed, a higher proportion were looking for work in 2012 
(19%) than in 2008 (15%), which might suggest a perception of improved 
employment opportunities or reflect a younger demographic likely to be 
more economically active. 
TABLE 3: Work Status of Household Members Aged 18-65
2008 2012
No. % No. %
Employed full-time 598 43 300 35
Employed part-time 208 15 207 24
Unemployed and looking for work 203 15 163 19
Unemployed and not looking for work 368 27 176 21
Total 1,377 100 846 100
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Cross-checking these figures with other data proved problematical. Offi-
cial census data does not differentiate between part-time and full-time 
employment, for example.20 The 2012 Census, which counts all people 
over the age of 14, estimated that 17% of the population of Harare Prov-
ince were not in the labour force.21 This group included students, eco-
nomically inactive homemakers, retirees, and people with disabilities. The 
group of labour force participants who were unemployed, corresponding 
to the AFSUN category of “unemployed and looking for work,” was 
14%. The remaining 69% of the adult population included formally and 
informally employed workers, piece workers, and seasonal workers. The 
Census report does not provide disaggregated statistics for workers in 
these vastly different working conditions. Unsurprisingly, the AFSUN 
survey in 2012 found much higher unemployment rates and higher rates 
of adults not participating in the labour force in low-income settlements 
than in the Census data for the provincial population as a whole.
Urban households worldwide reduce their vulnerability by drawing 
on multiple types of income sources rather than relying solely on paid 
employment.22 Having a wider range of income sources means that if one 
source fails, for example through job loss or illness, the household has 
other sources to draw on to mitigate the consequences. In the context 
of Harare, multiple sources of income were necessary for a household to 
survive during the crisis of 2008 when the Zimbabwean dollar was almost 
worthless. In 2012, the pattern of multiple household income sources 
persisted even as income from wage work became relatively more preva-
lent. Despite the decline in the overall proportion of household members 
in full-time wage work between 2008 and 2012 (Table 3), the proportion 
of households receiving income from wage work actually increased from 
55% in 2008 to 65% in 2012 (Table 4). And, despite the increase in the 
proportion of household members working part time, the proportion of 
households receiving income from casual work declined from 32% in 
2008 to 24% in 2012 (Table 4).  
The proportion of households deriving income from informal sec-
tor activity fell from 42% in 2008 to 34% in 2012, which does seem to 
indicate a small reduction in the importance of informality, which had 
become almost the only way for many households to survive in 2008. At 
the same time, the fact that one-third of all households were still obtain-
ing income from informal activity in 2012 indicates that there has not 
been a massive decline in the importance of informal income sources for 
the urban poor (Table 4). The proportion of households receiving income 
from cash remittances was relatively low in 2008 and declined still further 
(from 12% to 6%) in 2012. In general, remittances have been shown to be 
a critical income source for urban and rural households in Zimbabwe over 
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the last decade.23 At the same time, the numbers of Zimbabweans leaving 
the country (and, in turn, remitting) have continued to rise.24 What this 
data suggests is that poor urban households in Harare (from these com-
munities at least) are largely excluded from the remitting economy. 
The collapse of the Zimbabwean dollar, hyper-inflation, and the failure 
of many employers to provide salaries at the height of the crisis made it 
very difficult for household heads to estimate the income they received 
from each source in 2008. For this reason, the income data in Table 4, and 
the changes between 2008 and 2012, need to be treated with caution. In 
addition, the mean income from each source needs to be seen in relation 
to the percentage of households receiving income from that source; for 
example, even though the mean income of USD268 from formal busi-
ness makes it a relatively lucrative source, only 3% of households received 
income this way (Table 4). 
TABLE 4: Sources of Household Income and Mean Monthly Income 
from Each Source
2008 2012
No.
% of 
house-
holds
USD No.
% of 
house-
holds
USD
Wage work 253 55 77 229 65 440
Informal business 195 42 155 120 34 105
Casual work 150 32 95 83 24 138
Remittances 56 12 92 21 6 145
Rent 41 9 17 39 11 105
Formal business 14 3 268 6 2 227
Pension/disability 
allowance/grant 10 2 7 5 1 71
Sale of urban 
farm products 8 2 98 8 2 59
Sale of rural farm 
products 6 1 73 9 2 344
Gifts 6 1 19 16 5 96
Aid (money) 1 <1 6 0 0 N/A
Despite very high rates of formal sector unemployment, the most sig-
nificant income source in both 2008 and 2012 was wage work. How-
ever, the average monetary value of this income source appears to have 
increased nearly sixfold from USD77 per month in 2008 to USD440 per 
month in 2012 (Table 4). This change suggests that there might have been 
an improvement in household purchasing power, although the value of 
income from the second most common income source, informal busi-
ness, declined from USD155 per month in 2008 to USD105 per month 
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in 2012. The declining significance of incomes from informal business 
is linked to the reduction of demand in the informal sector as the for-
mal sector improved, police crackdowns on informal vending, and the 
decreased profit margins and elimination of the currency blackmarket in 
the informal sector.25 
To better understand the impact of household income changes on poverty, 
it is important to examine concurrent changes in household expenditure. 
The proportion of households incurring certain types of expenditure – 
including food and groceries, housing, education and medical expenses 
– was virtually the same in 2008 and 2012 (Table 5). However, there were 
significant changes in other expenditure categories. For example, the 
proportion of households spending money on transportation increased 
from 36% to 68% and on fuel from 58% to 70%, a clear reflection of the 
country’s fuel supply problems in 2008 and the subsequent availability by 
2012. There was a decline in the percentage of households purchasing 
goods for resale (21% to 8%) consistent with the reduction in formal and 
informal business. Few households (4%) reported saving any money in 
2008, a figure that increased to 15% in 2012, suggesting slightly greater 
disposable income and confidence in the financial system. On the other 
hand, the percentage of households incurring expenses on the servicing 
or repayment of debt increased threefold, from 3% to 9%, confirmation 
of the growing burden of debt facing some low-income households.
TABLE 5: Household Expenditures by Category and Mean Monthly 
Amount of Each Expense
2008 2012
No. 
% of 
house-
holds
USD No. 
% of 
house-
holds
USD
Food and groceries 428 94 57 346 99 91
Housing 413 90 7 308 89 69
Utilities 411 90 3 320 91 46
Fuel 266 58 10 244 70 16
Education 263 58 5 202 58 43
Transportation 164 36 29 238 68 46
Medical expenses 120 26 7 105 30 21
Goods purchased to sell 98 21 136 28 8 158
Funeral costs 42 9 11 38 11 42
Remittances 30 6 13 26 7 22
Savings 20 4 87 51 15 137
Debt service/repayment 15 3 6 32 9 74
Home-based care 11 2 15 11 3 19
Insurance 7 1 3 34 10 17
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A focus on the changes in expenses incurred by each household sug-
gests that life in Harare was far more costly in 2012 than in 2008, even 
with higher wage incomes. Expenditure in every category was higher in 
2012, especially in housing, education, debt servicing/repayment (around 
10 times as much), utilities (over 15 times the cost), and funeral costs 
(almost quadruple). Goods purchased to sell were the most costly expen-
diture item in both surveys (USD136 in 2008 and USD158 in 2012), 
dwarfing the incomes earned through informal and formal businesses 
and highlighting the financial risk incurred by households engaged in 
trading activities. Expenditure on food and groceries increased (but not 
as much as the cost of other basic necessities), rising from USD57 per 
month to USD91 per month (Table 5). Households are likely to have 
benefitted from more stable food prices that allowed them to plan for food 
expenses and maintain a tight budget where necessary. The sharp increase 
in expenditures on education is cause for concern that young people in 
low-income households will increasingly be marginalized from the more 
remunerative opportunities in the urban job market, thus reinforcing the 
intergenerational cycle of poverty.
4. HOUSEHOLD POVERTY
Income and expenditure data tell only part of the story of urban pov-
erty in Harare in 2008 and 2012. Non-monetary livelihood strategies and 
transactions are obscured in these calculations even though they make up 
a large part of household economies, especially for the poor. This section 
reports on the participants’ experiences of going without basic necessities, 
including food, as calculated in the Lived Poverty Index (LPI). The LPI 
score for each household is calculated on a scale of 0.0 to 4.0, whereby 
0.0 represents the extreme of never going without and 4.0 the opposite 
extreme of always going without basic needs, including food to eat; clean 
water for home use; medicine or medical treatment; electricity in the 
home; fuel to cook food; and a cash income.
The mean LPI in Harare fell from 2.2 in 2008 to 1.6 in 2012. The quartile 
distribution of LPI scores shows a significant improvement in lived pov-
erty in 2012, with the proportion of households in the least poor category 
increasing from 10% in 2008 to 28% in 2012 (Table 6). The proportion 
of households in the second least poor category also increased, from 35% 
in 2008 to 48% in 2012. The proportion of households in the lowest two 
quartiles correspondingly decreased from 55% in 2008 to 24% in 2012. 
12 AFRICAN FOOD SECURITY URBAN NETWORK (AFSUN)  
THE RETURN OF FOOD: POVERTY AND URBAN FOOD SECURITY IN ZIMBABWE AFTER THE CRISIS
TABLE 6: Lived Poverty Index (LPI) Scores
2008 2012
No. % No. %
0-1 (never to seldom 
without) 42 10 96 28
1.01-2.00 (seldom to 
sometimes without) 152 35 162 48
2.01-3.00 (sometimes 
to often without) 193 45 73 22
3.01-4.00 (often to 
always without) 43 10 6 2
Total 430 100 337 100
The breakdown of “basic needs gone without” illustrates the changing 
dimensions of household poverty in Harare. Table 7 provides the respons-
es to the questions used to calculate the LPI scores. Access to clean water 
and fuel for cooking improved but continued to be widespread problems 
in 2012. The proportion of households “many times/always” going with-
out decreased significantly between 2008 and 2012 for clean water (67% 
to 37%), electricity (61% to 43%), medicine/medical treatment (40% to 
14%) and cooking fuel (32% to 15%). At the same time, the proportion 
“never going without” clean water and electricity did not change signifi-
cantly. The problem of clean water reflects a long-standing infrastructure 
deficit in Harare that is similar to many other Southern African cities.26 
The problem in Harare is exacerbated by concerns about water safety due 
to mismanagement of existing infrastructure and a lack of resources. The 
persistent problem with access to electricity is also caused by an infrastruc-
ture deficit and is directly related to the political and economic crisis. The 
improvement in access to medical treatment is the result of the improved 
conditions in 2012 for importing medicine with stable currencies.
The two LPI indicators most relevant to food security are having a cash 
income and enough food to eat. With regard to the former there was a clear 
improvement between 2008 and 2012. The proportion of households that 
“always/many times” went without a cash income declined from 59% 
to 31% and the proportion that “never went without” improved from 
11% to 20%. Going without a cash income, even occasionally, means 
that households rely more on non-monetized livelihood activities, such 
as bartering, working for payment in kind, household production of basic 
needs (including urban agriculture), and drawing on social capital. In 
2012, almost half (49%) of all households had gone without a cash income 
once or twice or several times in the previous year. The relative increase in 
the proportion of employed people working part-time probably indicates 
an increasing casualization of wage labour, with a greater likelihood of 
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intermittent periods without a cash income in the household, even in a 
relatively stable macroeconomic context.
The proportion of households that “always/many times” went without 
enough food declined from 40% to 20% and the proportion that “never 
went without” improved from 19% to 25%. The LPI findings therefore 
suggest an overall improvement in incomes and food access although 55% 
still went without enough food. Even in the relatively stable economy of 
2012, three-quarters of households had experienced food shortages in the 
previous year.
TABLE 7: Frequency of Going Without Basic Needs Over the Previous Year
Enough 
food to 
eat (% of 
households)
Clean water 
for home 
use (% of 
households)
Medicine 
or medical 
treatment 
(% of 
households)
Electricity in 
home (% of 
households)
Fuel to 
cook food 
(% of 
households)
A cash in-
come (% of 
households)
2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012
Gone without 
many times/
always
40 20 67 37 40 14 61 43 32 15 59 31
Gone without 
once or twice/
several times
40 55 25 55 37 52 37 52 56 60 30 49
Never gone 
without 19 25 8 7 23 34 1 5 12 25 11 20
5. SHIFTING SOURCES OF FOOD
Households in Harare access food from multiple sources, although 
patronage of various different types of food outlet shifted significantly 
between 2008 and 2012. In 2008, only 30% of households accessed food 
at supermarkets, whereas in 2012 the vast majority (92%) did (Figure 
2). Increased use of supermarkets as a mainstream food source for the 
urban poor is consistent with the stabilization of the formal economy and 
the restocking of the empty shelves of 2008. Small shops and takeaways 
also increased dramatically in popularity, from being patronized by only 
17% of households in 2008 to 73% of households in 2012. The increased 
patronage of supermarkets and small shops/takeaways did not appear to 
displace other food sources, however, but rather expanded the range of 
sources used. Informal markets/street food remained the most popular 
source, falling marginally from 97% of households in 2008 to 94% in 
2012. 
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FIGURE 2: Household Food Sources
In both 2008 and 2012, supermarkets were most likely to be used on a 
monthly basis, in keeping with the frequency of wage and social grant 
payments (Figure 3). In contrast, informal markets were most likely to 
be used on a daily basis. Small shops/takeaways were also used more fre-
quently than supermarkets, and the most common use pattern shifted 
from monthly in 2008 to daily in 2012. Supermarkets are still used less 
frequently in part because they are often located in formally planned areas 
at some distance from the informal areas surveyed.27 Other advantages 
of informal markets and small shops/takeaways are that they are likely to 
facilitate price negotiation, offer flexibility in the quantity of food pur-
chased, and provide informal credit arrangements.28
Urban agriculture has been a constant and expanding feature of the urban 
landscape in Harare since the early 1990s.29 In recent years, urban agri-
culture has been associated primarily with low-income households with 
inadequate financial resources and insecure livelihood opportunities.30 
In both 2008 and 2012, very few households (around 2%) derived any 
income from the sale of home-grown produce. However, it has been and 
remains an important source of food for home consumption. The 2008 
survey found that well over half (60%) of the households were engaged 
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in urban agriculture as a food source (Figure 2). Furthermore, 70% of 
households producing their own food accessed it on at least a weekly 
basis (Figure 4). In 2012, the proportion of households reporting urban 
agriculture as a food source had declined from 60% to 46%, and 59% 
of these households used what they produced on at least a weekly basis. 
Although still very high by regional standards, urban agriculture appears 
to have declined in importance as purchased food has become more avail-
able. Another indication of this decline was evident in the responses to 
the question: “To what extent does the household rely on field crops and 
garden crops as additional livelihood strategies?” In the 2008 survey, 45% 
and 47% of households relied to some degree on garden crops and field 
crops respectively, whereas in 2012 these figures had fallen to 28% and 
23% (Table 8). In other words, the proportion of households using urban 
agriculture to supplement food from other sources also fell. The reduction 
in the post-2008 importance of urban agriculture is not as sharp as one 
would expect if it was merely a short-term response to an acute economic 
crisis, however. Indeed, the continued importance of urban agriculture 
for many households after 2008 suggests it is an enduring part of urban 
lifestyles in Harare rather than a short-term response to unusually difficult 
circumstances.
FIGURE 3: Frequency of Patronage of Main Food Sources 
TABLE 8: Reliance on Urban Agricultural Livelihood Activities
Garden crops Field crops Livestock Tree crops
2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012
Totally dependent 7 1 10 2 2 0 1 0
Partly dependent 20 11 23 13 3 <1 6 1
Slightly dependent 18 16 14 8 2 2 3 4
Not at all dependent 55 72 53 77 93 97 90 94
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FIGURE 4: Frequency of Sourcing Food from Urban Agriculture
Food remittances from the countryside have received growing atten-
tion in urban food security research as an important non-monetized 
food source.31 The proportion of households receiving food remittances 
increased slightly from 42% in 2008 to 47% in 2012 (Table 9). Most of 
this increase came from the rural areas (37% to 42%). Rural relatives 
remained the most important source of food remittances: 63% of recipient 
households in 2012, up from 55% in 2008. Although there is considerable 
controversy about the impact of the Fast Track Land Reform Programme 
on agriculture in Zimbabwe, there is an emerging consensus that resettled 
black farmers are producing a great deal more than they used to.32 This 
could explain the continued and even increased flow of food remittances 
over time. Alternatively, the increase in 2012 may simply have reflected 
a better agricultural season in 2012. Other shifts between 2008 and 2012 
included inter-urban food transfers with a slight drop in the proportion of 
households receiving food from other centres (from 43% to 37%). 
Further insight into the changing nature of rural to urban food remit-
tances can be gained through looking at the types of foodstuffs being 
remitted in 2008 and 2012. In 2008, the top three foods remitted (in 
terms of the proportion of recipient households) were cereals (95%), veg-
etables (35%), and foods made from beans, peas, lentils or nuts (30%) 
(Table 10). In 2012, the top three foods were cereals (80%), foods made 
from beans, peas, lentils, or nuts (39%), and fruits (24%). What is most 
striking is the decrease in remittances of vegetables (35% to 18%) and the 
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simultaneous increase in remittances of fruit (5% to 24%) and roots and 
tubers (9% to 23%). The greater variety of foods remitted in 2012 could 
be a reflection of improved transportation linkages and better and more 
diverse agricultural production. The decline in cereals as a proportion of 
types of remittances could be indicative of improved urban maize markets 
in 2012. Food remittances continued to be seen as important in 2012, 
with half (49%) of remittance-receiving households saying they were very 
important or critical to survival, although this figure did drop from 83% 
in 2008 (Figure 5). 
TABLE 9: Food Remittances from Rural and Urban Areas 
Remitters
2008 2012
No. % of recipient households No. 
% of recipient 
households
Rural relatives 105 55 103 63
Rural friends 19 10 12 7
Urban relatives 92 48 67 41
Urban friends 48 25 61 37
Geographical origin No. % of recipient households No.
% of recipient 
households
Rural areas only 71 37 69 42
Urban areas only 82 43 60 37
Rural and urban areas 39 20 35 21
% of total households 192 42 164 47
Note: multiple response question
TABLE 10: Types of Foods Remitted to Urban Households from 
Rural Areas
% of recipient households 
2008 2012
Cereals (foods made from grain) 95 80
Roots or tubers 9 23
Vegetables 35 18
Fruits 5 24
Meat, poultry, or offal 6 10
Eggs 2 7
Fresh or dried fish or shellfish 1 8
Foods made from beans, peas, lentils, or nuts 30 39
Cheese, yoghurt, milk, or other milk products 6 4
Foods made with oil, fat, or butter 6 13
Sugar or honey 1 9
N 110 115
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FIGURE 5: Importance of Food Remittances for Households
6. LEVELS OF FOOD INSECURITY
The AFSUN questionnaire measured food security levels using four 
international measurement tools developed by the Food and Nutrition 
Technical Assistance Project (FANTA):33 
?? ?????????? ????? ??????????? ??????? ?????? ????????? ???? ??????
measures the degree of food insecurity during the month prior to the 
survey. An HFIAS score is calculated for each household based on 
answers to nine “frequency-of occurrence” questions. The minimum 
score is 0 and the maximum is 27. The higher the score, the more 
food insecurity the household experienced.
?? ?????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????? ??? ?????
indicator uses the responses to the HFIAS questions to group house-
holds into four levels of household food insecurity: food secure, mildly 
food insecure, moderately food insecure, and severely food insecure. 
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to how many food groups are consumed within the household in the 
previous 24 hours. The maximum number, based on the FAO clas-
sification of food groups for Africa, is 12. An increase in the average 
number of different food groups consumed provides a quantifiable 
measure of improved household food access.
?? ??????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ????????????
indicator captures changes in the household’s ability to ensure that 
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food is available above a minimum level the year round. Households 
are asked to identify in which months (during the past 12) they did 
not have access to sufficient food to meet their household needs.
In 2008, these areas of Harare had one of the worst HFIAS scores of all the 
low-income neighbourhoods in 11 cities surveyed by AFSUN (a mean of 
14.7 and a median of 16.0) (Table 11). Only Manzini in Swaziland (a 
country ravaged by HIV and AIDS) had a higher mean (14.9) than Harare 
although its median score was lower (14.0). In 2012, both the mean and 
median scores in Harare were considerably lower (at 9.6 and 10.0 respec-
tively). Scores like that in 2008 would have made it one of the less food 
insecure cities in the region (akin to Windhoek and Maputo but better 
than cities such as Gaborone, Lusaka and Cape Town). 
TABLE 11: HFIAS Results in AFSUN Surveys
No. of households Mean Median
Harare (2012) 342 9.6 10.0
Harare (2008) 454 14.7 16.0
Windhoek 442 9.3 9.0
Gaborone 391 10.8 11.0
Maseru 795 12.8 13.0
Manzini 489 14.9 14.0
Maputo 389 10.4 10.0
Blantyre 431 5.3 4.0
Lusaka 386 11.5 11.0
Cape Town 1,026 10.7 11.0
Msunduzi 548 11.3 11.0
Johannesburg 976 4.7 1.5
The HFIAP scores provide further insight into the absolute and relative 
improvement in food security status in Harare between 2008 and 2012. In 
2008, Harare had the lowest number of food secure households (2%) and 
the second highest number of severely food insecure households (72%). In 
2012, the share of food secure households had increased to 10%; the share 
of mildly food insecure households increased from 3% to 7%; the share 
of moderately food insecure households decreased from 24% to 20%; 
and the proportion of severely food insecure households fell from 72% 
to 63% (Figure 6). Even with the drop in the mean and median HFIAS 
scores, the share of severely food insecure households remained alarm-
ingly high in 2012. The discrepancy in the picture presented by changes 
in the HFIAS as opposed to the more incremental HFIAP redistribution 
is consistent with an argument that food security gains were accrued to 
a small group of households that benefitted from economic stabilization.
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FIGURE 6: Distribution of Households in HFIAP Categories 
Aggregate household dietary diversity also appears to have improved 
between 2008 and 2012. The HDDS rose from a mean score of 4.8 in 
2008 to 6.5 in 2012. The median score improved from 5 in 2008 to 6 in 
2012. A comparison of the distribution of HDDS scores at the two points 
in time shows a significant fall in the number of households with scores 
of 1-5 (Figure 7). Whereas nearly one-third (29%) of households in 2008 
were in the extremely low range of 1-3, only 9% were in this category 
in 2012. Many more households were also at the high end of the scale in 
2012, with 30% of households consuming foods from at least eight food 
groups on the day prior to the survey compared to only 12% in 2008. 
The improvement in dietary diversity is reflected in the more widespread 
consumption of foods from almost every food group (Table 12). The only 
food group consumed by a lower proportion of households in 2012 than 
in 2008 was vegetables (consumed by 92% of households in 2008 and by 
83% of households in 2012). The most substantial increases were in the 
consumption of dairy products (12% in 2008 and 39% in 2012), meat 
(22% in 2008 and 50% in 2012), fruits (15% in 2008 and 41% in 2012), 
and sugar or honey (64% in 2008 and 83% in 2012). With the argu-
10
20
30
2008
Food secure Mildly food insecure
Moderately food insecure Severely food insecure
2012
40
50
60
80 
90 
100 
70
%
 o
f h
ou
se
ho
ld
s 
0
URBAN FOOD SECURITY SERIES NO. 22  21
able exception of increased fruit consumption, the foods with the sharp-
est increases conform to a more typical urban diet associated with the 
dietary transition taking place throughout the Global South.34 Even as 
food becomes more abundant and accessible, the increased consumption 
of fatty, calorie-dense, and processed foods could be putting Harare on a 
more general path with negative impacts on health in the long term.
FIGURE 7: Distribution of Household Dietary Diversity Scores
 
TABLE 12: Food Groups Consumed in Prior 24 Hours
2008 2012
No. % No. %
Cereals (foods made from grain) 455 99 344 98
Roots or tubers 57 12 109 31
Vegetables 423 92 293 83
Fruits 70 15 142 41
Meat, poultry, or offal 103 22 176 50
Eggs 40 9 75 21
Fresh or dried fish or shellfish 81 18 64 18
Foods made from beans, peas, lentils, or nuts 84 18 87 25
Cheese, yoghurt, milk, or other milk products 54 12 138 39
Foods made with oil, fat, or butter 261 56 255 73
Sugar or honey 295 64 292 83
Other foods 284 62 295 84
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The fourth measurement tool for assessing household food security was 
the MAHFP. Fewer households experienced many months of inadequate 
food provisioning in the 2012 survey than in 2008 (Figure 8). 
FIGURE 8: Distribution of MAHFP Scores
In 2008, September was the leanest month, during which three-quarters 
of households had inadequate food (Figure 9). November and December 
were the best months in the 2008 survey. In the 2012 survey, however, 
January was the most likely month for inadequate food provisioning and 
December was the least common month. 
FIGURE 9: Proportion of Households with Inadequate Food  
Provisioning by Month
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The marked change in seasonal pattern can partly be explained by the fact 
that in 2008, households were far more sensitive to the agricultural cycle 
where June-October is the dry season when little food is harvested. With 
people relying heavily on remittances and urban agriculture in 2008, it 
stands to reason that the harvest cycle contributed to September being the 
leanest month. The greater availability of food for purchase in 2012 meant 
that households were more able to smooth their consumption in the lean 
agricultural season. In addition, the emergence of January as the month 
with greatest food inadequacy is a reflection of a shift back to a long-
standing pattern of overspending and overconsumption during December 
festivities.
7. DETERMINANTS OF VARIABILITY 
 IN FOOD SECURITY
While many factors contribute to food access, rapid price increases such 
as those experienced during the extraordinarily high inflation of 2008 
force consumers to cut back on purchases, reduce food consumption, sac-
rifice nutritional value for sustenance, and make trade-offs between food 
and other basic needs. Respondents in both 2008 and 2012 were asked 
whether the household had gone without certain types of food because 
of prices over the previous six months. In 2008, a third of households 
(32%) experienced daily shortages due to food price increases (Figure 
10). More than two-thirds experienced going without food on at least a 
weekly basis and only 4% never went without food. In 2012, the propor-
tion experiencing daily shortages had declined from 32% to only 4%. On 
the other hand, the proportion of households that had never experienced 
shortages increased even more dramatically from 4% in 2008 to 51% in 
2012 (Figure 10). 
In 2008, the most common foods that people went without due to price 
increases were dairy products (84%), eggs (83%), meats, poultry, or offal 
(79%), and roots or tubers (78%) (Figure 11). These food types tend to be 
rich in protein, fats, and micronutrients, and omitting them from the diet 
on a consistent basis could have long-term health consequences, espe-
cially for children. Few households went without vegetables because of 
price increases, probably reflecting the importance of urban horticulture 
and the consistent availability of vegetables in the city. In 2012, those 
households that went without food due to price increases went without 
meat, poultry, or offal (83%), cereals (52%) and dairy products (54%).
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FIGURE 10: Frequency of Going Without Food Due to Price Increases
FIGURE 11: Types of Foods Not Consumed Due to Price Increases
Most of the analysis in this report has dealt with households in the aggre-
gate. However, by cross-tabulating household characteristics with mean 
food security scores, it is possible to determine which types of house-
holds were more or less food secure and how this changed between 2008 
and 2012. Table 13 shows that there was an overall improvement in food 
security scores among all household size groups. However, the magnitude 
of the improvement did differ: for example, households with 1-5 mem-
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bers reduced their mean HFIAS by 4.7 and improved their HDDS and 
MAHFP by 1.7. The equivalent improvements for households with 6-10 
members were 5.6 (HFIAS), 1.7 (HDDS) and 1.5 (MAHFP). In 2012 as 
in 2008, households with fewer members had lower HFIAS scores. The 
difference in mean HFIAS scores between households with 1-5 members 
and those with 6-10 members was therefore less in 2012 (0.9) than in 
2008 (1.8), suggesting that additional household members were less chal-
lenging to feed in 2012. 
The mean HDDS score for households with 1-5 members was higher 
than for households with 6-10 members by a consistent difference of 
0.3. There was no difference in MAHFP scores for these two groups in 
2008, but in 2012 smaller households had a slightly better MAHFP score 
(9.0) than medium-sized households (8.8) (Table 13). In all food insecu-
rity scores, very large households consistently scored worse than smaller 
households, a reflection of the higher dependency ratios.
TABLE 13: Mean Food Insecurity Scores by Household Size, Type 
and LPI Score
Household size
HFIAS HDDS MAHFP
2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012
1-5 13.9 9.2 4.9 6.6 7.3 9.0
6-10 15.7 10.1 4.6 6.3 7.3 8.8
>10 17.7 14.8 4.0 4.2 5.0 7.0
Household type
HFIAS HDDS MAHFP
2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012
Female-centred 16.1 10.5 4.3 6.2 6.6 8.8
Male-centred 14.4 9.1 5.1 5.6 7.5 9.6
Nuclear 14.3 9.1 4.8 6.6 7.3 9.0
Extended 14.4 9.4 4.9 6.9 7.6 8.8
LPI score
HFIAS HDDS MAHFP
2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012
0.00-1.00 8.5 4.5 6.2 7.6 9.3 10.7
1.01-2.00 12.5 10.1 5.3 6.1 8.2 8.9
2.01-3.00 17.1 14.1 4.2 5.7 6.4 6.6
3.01-4.00 18.9 16.0 4.0 4.8 6.1 9.5
In 2008, and in 2012, female-centred households were the least food 
secure type of household. There was a smaller gap between the HFIAS of 
nuclear and female-centred households in 2012 (1.4) than in 2008 (1.8), 
suggesting a relatively greater improvement for female-centred house-
holds (Table 13). The difference between female-centred and extended 
households closed even more, from 1.7 in 2008 to 1.1 in 2012, reflecting a 
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worse position for extended households relative to other household types 
in 2012. The relatively worse position for extended households, which by 
definition have more members, seems to contradict the observation that 
being a household with more members was relatively less detrimental to 
household food security status in 2012. Nonetheless, it bears noting that 
many female-centred and nuclear households also have more than five 
members. 
Female-centred households improved slightly more relative to nuclear 
households in terms of the HDDS, with a difference of 0.5 in 2008 and 
0.4 in 2012 (Table 13). Male-centred households improved the least in 
terms of HDDS, falling from the highest mean score in 2008 to the low-
est mean score in 2012 among household types. Male-centred households 
are the least common type and it is therefore difficult to generalize from 
these small numbers, but it is reasonable to expect that single men prepare 
for themselves a narrower set of meals, or possibly eat more at restaurants 
with a narrow selection of foods. Extended households had the highest 
mean HDDS in 2012 (Table 13). The difference in MAHFP scores among 
household types in 2012 was less than in 2008, with female-centred and 
male-centred households improving their scores relative to nuclear and 
extended households. Extended households improved the least in terms 
of MAHFP (difference of 1.2), while female-centred households showed 
the most improvement (difference of 2.2). Household type is intertwined 
with issues of gender and poverty and the relatively high food insecurity 
scores for female-centred households in 2008 and 2012 reflect the link 
between gender and poverty in Southern African cities. The closing of 
the food security gap between female-centred and other household types 
suggests that single women with dependants were more severely affected 
than men and married women by the economic crisis.
Lower LPI scores were correlated with better food security scores in both 
surveys and by all measures of food security status. The single exception 
was the higher MAHFP score in 2012 for households with an LPI score 
of 3.01-4.00 than for households with LPI scores of 2.01-3.00 (Table 13). 
This was an anomaly due to the extremely small number of households 
with LPI scores above 3.01 in 2012 (only 2% of households surveyed). 
There was a wider difference in the mean HFIAS of the least poor and the 
second least poor group in 2012 (5.6) than in 2008 (4.0), and less of a dif-
ference between the two middle groups in 2012 (4.0) than in 2008 (4.6). 
HDDS was also relatively much better for the least poor households than 
the second least poor households in 2012 than in 2008 (difference of 1.5 
rather than 0.9). The gap in HDDS between households with LPI scores 
of 1.01-2.00 and households with LPI scores of 2.01-3.00 was less in 2012 
(0.4) than in 2008 (1.1). 
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Cross-tabulating the food insecurity scores with the use of selected food 
sources by the households revealed further trends. In 2008, households 
that received food remittances from the rural areas had a lower mean 
HFIAS (13.6) than households that did not receive these remittances 
(14.8) (Table 14). In 2012, the opposite was true and households that 
received remittances had a higher mean HFIAS (10.1) than households 
that did not (9.7). This finding is consistent with the “importance of 
remittances for survival” finding (Figure 5), with remittances evidently 
playing a more important role in reducing the food insecurity of house-
holds that received them in 2008. There was little change in the relative 
difference in HDDS or MAHFP between these groups of households in 
2008 and 2012 (Table 14). 
TABLE 14: Mean Food Insecurity Scores by Selected Food Sources
Food from rural 
remittances?
HFIAS HDDS MAHFP
2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012
Yes 13.6 10.1 5.2 6.8 7.5 9.2
No 14.8 9.7 4.7 6.4 7.2 8.9
Food from urban 
agriculture?
HFIAS HDDS MAHFP
2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012
Yes 14.8 9.3 4.7 6.5 7.3 8.9
No 14.2 10.1 4.8 6.4 7.1 9.0
The opposite trend appeared in cross-tabulations of household food inse-
curity indicators with households that grew some of their own food and 
those that did not. In 2008, households that reported growing their own 
food as a food source had a mean HFIAS of 14.8, which was higher than 
the mean HFIAS among households that never produced their own food 
(14.2) (Table 14). In 2012, this relationship was inverted and the house-
holds that did not produce any of their own food had a higher HFIAS 
(10.1) than those that produced some of their own food (9.3). One possible 
explanation for this trend is that many vulnerable households that do not 
normally produce their own food and, as a result, lack the necessary tools, 
inputs, and knowledge of agriculture, were engaging in subsistence food 
production during the crisis. The proportion of households engaging in 
urban agriculture in 2008 suggests that many vulnerable households were 
turning to this source as a coping mechanism, temporarily raising the 
food insecurity score for households engaged in urban agriculture relative 
to other households. The relatively positive score for households engaged 
in urban agriculture in 2012 suggests that these are households that nor-
mally produce their own food, not only in times of acute crisis. For these 
households, urban agriculture appears to have a positive impact on their 
food security status. As with rural remittances, there were negligible dif-
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ferences in the HDDS and MAHFP scores between these categories of 
households.
The cross-tabulation of household food insecurity scores with income 
terciles shows a remarkable consistency in the differences by group in 2008 
and 2012 for all food insecurity scores (Table 15). The strong correlation 
between income level and food security status is consistent with other 
AFSUN surveys.35 The type of income is also shown to have a significant 
impact on the food security scores, and the gap in HFIAS between house-
holds with a wage income source and without a wage income source wid-
ened from 0.4 in 2008 to 2.8 in 2012 (Table 15). The gap in terms of 
HDDS (from 0.2 in 2008 to 0.7 in 2012) and MAHFP (from 0.1 to 1.6) 
also widened, as households with a wage income benefitted much more 
from improvements in food security than households without a wage 
income. These findings provide further evidence to the observation that 
improvements in household food security in 2012 relative to 2008 were 
much greater for a small group of people. The economies of households 
receiving a wage income are more directly connected to the formal food 
economy, and policies directed at currency stabilization, food price stabi-
lization through food imports, and the development of supermarkets are 
more likely to benefit this group.
TABLE 15: Mean Food Insecurity Scores by Income Level and  
Income from Wages
Income 
HFIAS HDDS MAHFP
2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012
Lowest income 16.9 12.9 3.9 5.5 6.5 7.3
Middle income 14.2 10.1 4.8 6.3 7.3 8.9
Highest income 13.3 7.2 5.3 7.3 7.7 10.2
Income from 
wage work?
HFIAS HDDS MAHFP
2008 2012 2008 2012 2008 2012
Yes 14.4 8.7 4.9 6.7 7.3 9.5
No 14.8 11.5 4.7 6.0 7.2 7.9
8. CONCLUSION
The status of household food security in low-income neighbourhoods 
in Harare improved in 2012 relative to 2008, and yet persistently high 
rates of severe food insecurity demonstrate that the daily need to access 
adequate food continued to be a major challenge for most households. 
The stabilization of the formal economy by 2012 shaped household food 
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access in some key ways: more households received income from wage 
work, wage income was higher, and supermarkets and small shops were 
much more important food sources than they were in 2008 (although 
alternative food sources remained important). Most households contin-
ued to rely on a diverse set of livelihood and food security strategies even 
under these improved economic conditions, drawing on non-monetary 
informal food sources such as rural remittances and urban agriculture in 
consistently high numbers. Food price increases were less of a problem in 
2012 than in 2008, but they continued to impede many households from 
accessing food on a regular basis.
The findings reported here suggest that improvements in food security 
status have accrued mostly to the least poor households. More households 
fell into the least poor category in 2012, suggesting a combination of two 
scenarios: households becoming less poor while also becoming less food 
insecure, and households that were already in the least poor category in 
2008 that had higher food security scores in 2012. Because the survey did 
not track the same households, these trends represent a general widening 
of the food security gap in keeping with a widening poverty gap in low-
income urban communities.
Many more households were in the least poor category in 2012, which 
appears to be the main factor that led them to be more food secure. The 
poorest categories of households were less food insecure in 2012 than in 
2008, but they were more food insecure relative to the least poor house-
holds. These trends show that food security status in Harare is inextri-
cably linked to other dimensions of poverty and that, even within low-
income neighbourhoods, there is a wide differentiation in poverty rates 
and food security status among households. The key lesson for policy-
makers is that even in the context of overall economic improvement, food 
insecurity remains endemic among the poorest segments of the urban 
population. Households are already accustomed to drawing on resources 
outside of the formal economy and improvements in employment income 
have not reversed that trend. These alternative livelihood strategies should 
therefore be considered as a normal part of urban life and supported with 
state resources that can improve access to food for the most marginalized 
groups and ensure the environmental sustainability of activities such as 
urban agriculture. 
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The nadir of  Zimbabwe’s political and economic crisis in 2008 coin-
cided with the implementation of  a baseline household food security 
survey in Harare by AFSUN. This survey found that households in low-
income urban areas in Zimbabwe’s capital were far worse off  in terms 
of  all the food insecurity and poverty indicators than households in the 
other 10 Southern African cities surveyed by AFSUN. The central ques-
tion addressed in this report is whether food security in Zimbabwe’s 
urban centres has improved. AFSUN conducted a follow-up survey in 
2012 that allows for direct longitudinal comparisons of  continuity and 
change. The status of  household food security in low-income neigh-
bourhoods in Harare was improved in 2012 relative to 2008, and yet 
persistently high rates of  severe food insecurity demonstrate that the 
daily need to access adequate food continued to be a major challenge. 
The key lesson for policymakers is that even in the context of  overall 
economic improvement, food insecurity remains endemic among the 
poorest segments of  the urban population. Households are already 
accustomed to drawing on resources outside of  the formal economy 
and improvements in employment income have not reversed that trend. 
These alternative livelihood strategies should therefore be considered 
as a normal part of  urban life and supported with state resources that 
can improve access to food for the most marginalized groups. 
